BOD 26-04 Compliance Checklist: 12 Items to Close Before December 7
Five weeks from the Phase III deadline, here is the list. Twelve items, grouped the way an assessor works through them, with the evidence each one asks you to produce. Federal agencies need all twelve by December 7. Everyone else should treat the list as what it is: the 2027 exam. (New to the directive? Start with the BOD 26-04 explainer.)
Most of what has been written about BOD 26-04 comes from vulnerability-management vendors, and it reads that way: risk tiers, remediation clocks, KEV status, patch cadence. Useful. Also incomplete, because the directive did something those guides skip past. In Requirement 8 it named printers, and once a printer is on the inventory, everything that leaves the printer is on the inventory too.
This checklist is the buyer-side version. It covers what the directive text requires, what follows from it, and the two items nobody else lists: the MFP fleet itself, and the scan-to-email leg where the document leaves the device over SMTP. Each item ends with the question an assessor will ask, so you can answer it before they do.
Facts are from the directive text and CISA's published guidance. Where something is our read rather than the directive's words, it says so.
Block one: inventory and ownership (items 1 to 4)
Requirement 8 is an inventory requirement. Phase III, within 180 days of the June 10 issuance, says agencies "shall ensure that all assets reported in the CDM Federal Dashboard, including workstations, servers, mobile devices, cloud assets, printers, and other networked assets, include all associated IP addresses, including RFC 1918 (IPv4) or RFC 4193 (IPv6) private IP addresses." Printers were never exempt before; they were invisible. This block makes them visible.
- Every printer and MFP is in the asset inventory, by name. Model, serial, firmware version, location, VLAN. Leased devices count. Devices Facilities owns count. If the only list is the vendor's billing report, you do not have an inventory. Assessor asks: show me the record for this device.
- Every device record carries its private IP address. This is the specific thing Requirement 8 added. RFC 1918 and RFC 4193 addresses are the internal-only ranges where nearly every printer lives, and until June they were out of scope by definition under BOD 19-02. Assessor asks: match this inventory row to this vulnerability finding.
- Every device is tagged by organization, environment, exposure, and asset type. That is Requirement 7, the companion to 8. "Exposure: internal" is now a tracked category with its own remediation clock, not a reason to skip the device. Assessor asks: which of these are internal-only, and who owns them?
- Someone owns printer patching, and it is written down. Firmware updates on a mixed fleet are vendor-gated and manual. The directive's clocks run whether or not a human is assigned. Assessor asks: who gets the ticket when a KEV entry matches this firmware?
Block two: patch and configuration (items 5 to 8)
Once the fleet is visible, its vulnerabilities fall under the directive's four-variable risk model (asset exposure, KEV status, exploit automation, technical impact) and the clocks that come with it: 3 calendar days plus forensic triage for the worst combinations, then 14-day and 60-day tiers, down to fix-on-upgrade. Print firmware does not patch on a 3-day clock. The directive anticipated that, and its remediation notes name removing an asset's exposure as valid mitigation when patching cannot meet the timeline.
- Printer segments are inside discovery and vulnerability enumeration. BOD 23-01 already required 7-day discovery and 14-day enumeration across all IP-addressable assets. In practice, scanners classify printers as fragile devices and skip them by default, so the VLAN stays dark. Use passive discovery or a vendor-safe scan profile. Assessor asks: show me the last enumeration of the print VLAN.
- Firmware is matched against the KEV Catalog, fleet-wide. Print-path vulnerabilities are already in the catalog; CVE-2023-27350 in a print-management server carried confirmed exploitation in CISA's own joint advisory. Any device on a KEV-listed version has a clock running from the day you find it. Assessor asks: which devices are on KEV-listed firmware today?
- Default admin credentials are gone and the admin panel is not reachable from user segments. The 2024 Xerox VersaLink pass-back vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-12510, CVE-2024-12511) worked by redirecting a device to an attacker-controlled server and harvesting the credentials stored in it. The admin login is the front door to that store. Assessor asks: who can reach this device's admin page, and with what password?
- Every device you cannot patch has a documented compensating control. Not a risk-acceptance memo. A control that removes the vulnerable pathway, which is the directive's own example of changing the facts when the clock cannot be met. Legacy MFPs that will never see another firmware release live or die on this item. Assessor asks: this device is unpatchable; what did you do instead?
Block three: data in motion (items 9 to 12)
This is the block the vulnerability guides do not have, because it is not about the device. It is about what the device sends. Every MFP with scan-to-email enabled is a mail client with a stored credential, and by default it relays the scan in cleartext over port 25 to a mail server, where the document then lives forever. Cleartext SMTP egress from device segments is already written up as an encryption-in-transit finding under GLBA, HIPAA, and FTC Safeguards language. With printers on the inventory, it becomes a BOD 26-04 finding too.
- Outbound port 25 is blocked from device segments. The easiest finding to write and the easiest to close. If a printer can reach a mail server on 25, a scan can leave the building unencrypted. Assessor asks: show me the egress rule for the print VLAN.
- Encryption on the scan-to-email path is enforced, and it fails closed. Port 587 with TLS and certificate validation is the standard remediation, and it is necessary. It is also where most fleets stop, and most MFP configurations fail open: when the TLS negotiation fails, the device sends anyway or accepts an unvalidated certificate. "TLS is configured" and "encryption is enforced" are different audit answers. Assessor asks: what does this device do when the mail server's certificate does not validate?
- No reusable mail credential sits on the device. Authenticated SMTP requires storing a working mail login in the printer configuration, behind the admin panel from item 7. The port 587 fix does not reduce that exposure; it introduces the credential it depends on. Assessor asks: if I owned this printer's admin panel, what could I log in to?
- Every scan produces per-document delivery evidence. Who received it, when, from where, and whether anyone else has accessed it since. SMTP at any port produces none of this; "check the mail server logs" is not an answer an examiner accepts in a walkthrough. One encrypted hop also ends at the relay, and the document then rests unencrypted in mailboxes, sent-items folders, archives, and backups. Assessor asks: who received the scan sent from this device last Tuesday at 2:14?
The item nobody is reading
Look at where the list gets hard. Items 1 through 8 have vendor tooling behind them: discovery platforms, firmware management, KEV feeds, configuration baselines. Items 9 through 12 do not, because they are not device properties. They are transport properties. The scan leaves the printer, and from that moment the printer's security posture has nothing to say about where the document goes or what happens to it.
That is why the scan-to-email leg is the finding assessors reach first once printers are visible: it is observable from the network, it maps to language they already use under GLBA, HIPAA, and FTC Safeguards, and the usual remediation (port 587) leaves four gaps a reviewer who looks one layer deeper will find. Next week's post is about that leg alone.
You are not a federal agency. Read it anyway.
A Binding Operational Directive binds federal civilian agencies. It does not bind a bank, a dealership group, a school district, or a hospital. That is the legal answer, and it is the wrong thing to plan around.
Federal remediation frameworks propagate. FedRAMP published a formal response to BOD 26-04 within weeks. The KEV Catalog, created by a 2021 directive that bound only agencies, became the de facto commercial vendor-risk benchmark within two years. The same printers, from the same vendors, running the same firmware, sit in every regulated private-sector building in the country, and the examiners who walk those buildings read CISA. December 7, 2026 becomes the reference date they use. Plan to it.
By industry, the item that bites first:
- Banks and credit unions. Item 9 and item 12. FFIEC examiners already ask about encryption in transit; NCUA Part 748 and GLBA Safeguards put scan-to-email squarely inside the control set. The evidence question (item 12) is the one that stalls a walkthrough.
- Dealerships. Item 10 and item 11. The FTC Safeguards Rule requires encryption of customer information in transit; a scan-to-email fleet with stored mail credentials is the common gap, and dealership groups run dozens of devices across rooftops.
- K-12 districts. Item 1 and item 9. Fleets are large, leased, and owned by nobody in IT. FERPA and COPPA turn a cleartext scan of a student record into a reportable event.
- Healthcare. Item 12 above all. HIPAA and HITECH want to know where ePHI went and who touched it. A scan that landed in a mailbox cannot answer.
What to do this week
Run the twelve items against your own fleet. Most organizations can close items 1 through 9 with time and configuration work, no new spending. Items 10 through 12 are the ones you may not be able to prove with the tooling you have.
For those, use the Audit Gap Handler. It is the one-page version of this list written in the language your examiner will use, with the three transport items framed as evidence requests rather than product features. If you run PaperCut or another print-management platform, keep it: SecureMFP sits alongside it as the transport for scan-to-email, and the print-management side of items 5 through 8 stays where it is.
For how SecureMFP closes items 10 through 12 specifically (enforced transport that fails closed, no reusable credential on the device, a single purged copy instead of mailbox persistence, and a per-document access log), the hub page has the short version and the technology page has the long one.
Sources: CISA Binding Operational Directive 26-04, Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (June 10, 2026), including Required Actions Phase III items 7 and 8 and the notes to Table 1; CISA BOD 23-01 (October 2022); CISA and FBI Joint Advisory AA23-131A (CVE-2023-27350); Rapid7, Xerox VersaLink pass-back vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-12510, CVE-2024-12511), February 2025; Tenable Nessus discovery settings ("Fragile Devices: Scan Network Printers," disabled by default); FedRAMP, Response to CISA BOD 26-04. BOD 26-04 binds federal civilian executive branch agencies. Statements about auditor, examiner, and insurer behavior describe how prior federal frameworks have propagated into commercial practice. This is not legal or compliance advice.
Find out where your fleet fails the four transport findings
The Audit Gap Handler is the one-page version of items 9 through 12, written in the language your examiner uses. Run it before they do.
Get the Audit Gap Handler